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1DisappearingPrivateReputationsinLong-RunRelationships
Abstract. For games of public reputation with uncertainty over types and imperfect
public monitoring, Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson [4] showed that an informed player facing
short-lived uninformed opponents cannot maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy
that is not part of an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty over types. This paper extends
that result to games in which the uninformed player is long-lived and has private beliefs, so that
the informed player’s reputation is private. The rate at which reputations disappear is uniform
across equilibria and reputations also disappear in sufﬁciently long discounted ﬁnitely-repeated
games.
Journal of Economic Literature Classiﬁcation Numbers C70, C78.
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21 Introduction
Reputation games capture settings in which a long-lived player beneﬁts from other players’
uncertainty about her characteristics. Reputation effects arise most cleanly when a long-lived
player faces a sequence of short-lived players who believe the long-lived player might be com-
mittedtothestage-game“Stackelberg”action. Insuchasetting, theStackelbergpayoffprovides
a lower bound on the long-lived player’s average payoff, provided she is sufﬁciently patient (Fu-
denberg and Levine [5, 6]).
In an earlier paper (Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson [4]), we showed that if monitoring
is imperfect and the reputation of the long-lived player is public, meaning that the public sig-
nals allow the long-lived player to infer the short-lived players’ beliefs about the long-lived
player’s type, then reputation effects eventually disappear. Almost surely, the short-lived player
eventually learns the type of the long-lived player.
Many long-run relationships involve two (or more) long-lived players. Reputation effects
arise in this setting as well, and can be more powerful than when the uninformed player is
short-lived. Intertemporal incentives can induce the uninformed agent to choose actions even
more advantageous to the informed long-lived player than the myopic best reply to the Stack-
elberg action (Celentani, Fudenberg, Levine, and Pesendorfer [1]). In addition, it is natural for
an analysis of long-lived uninformed players to encompass private reputations: the actions of
both players are not only imperfectly monitored, but the monitoring need not have the special
structure required for the informed player to infer the uninformed player’s beliefs. Instead, the
uninformed player’s beliefs can depend critically on his own past actions, which the informed
3player cannot observe.1
In this paper, we show that reputations eventually disappear when the uninformed player
is long-lived and beliefs are private.2 We also improve on our earlier paper by showing that
the rate at which reputations disappear is uniform across equilibria (Theorem 3), and that rep-
utations disappear in sufﬁciently long discounted ﬁnitely-repeated games (Theorem 4). In our
analysis, the long-lived informed player (player 1) may be a commitment type that plays an ex-
ogenously speciﬁed strategy or a normal type that maximizes expected payoffs. We show that
if the commitment strategy is not an equilibrium strategy for the normal type in the complete-
information game, then in any Nash equilibrium of the incomplete-information repeated game,
almost surely the uninformed player (player 2) will learn that a normal long-lived player is in-
deed normal. Thus, a long-lived player cannot indeﬁnitely maintain a reputation for behavior
that is not credible given her type.
This result has implications for the way players eventually play rather than for expected
payoffs at the beginning of the game. We believe that such long-run equilibrium properties are
relevant in many situations. For example, an analyst may encounter an on-going interaction
1Forexample, theinferencesaﬁrmdrawsfrommarketpricesmaydependupontheﬁrm’soutputchoices, which
others do not observe. Because private reputations arise when the uninformed player privately observes his own
past actions, they occur most naturally with a single, long-lived uninformed player rather than a sequence of short-
lived players. In [4], we assumed that the short-run player’s actions are public, allowing a natural interpretation
of the assumption that short-run players’ observed their predecessors’ actions, but also ensuring that player 1’s
reputation (player 2’s belief) is public.
2Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson [4, Theorem 6] is a partial result for the case of a long-lived uninformed
player whose beliefs are public. That result is unsatisfactory, even for the public-reputation case, in that it imposes
a condition on the behavior of the long-lived uninformed player in equilibrium. See footnote 5 for more details.
4whose beginnings are difﬁcult to identify. Long-run equilibrium properties are then an impor-
tant guide to behavior. Alternatively, a social planner or a welfare analysis may be concerned
with the continuation payoffs of the long-run player and with the fate of all short-run players,
even those in the distant future. Finally, we may be interested in the steady states of the model,
especially when pursuing applications, again directing attention to long-run properties.
We view our results as suggesting that a model of long-run reputations should incorporate
some mechanism by which the uncertainty about types is continually replenished. For example,
Holmstrom [10], Cole, Dow, and English [3], Mailath and Samuelson [12], and Phelan [13]
assume that the type of the long-lived player is governed by a stochastic process rather than
being determined once and for all at the beginning of the game. Reputations can then have
long-run implications.
Establishing a disappearing-reputations result for the case of public reputations and short-
lived uninformed players is relatively straightforward (Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson [4]).
Since monitoring is imperfect, deviations from equilibrium play by player 1 cannot be un-
ambiguously detected by player 2, precluding the trigger-strategy equilibria that support per-
manent reputations in perfect-monitoring games. Instead, the long-run convergence of beliefs
ensures that eventually any current signal of play has an arbitrarily small effect on player 2’s be-
liefs. Thus, when reputations are public, player 1 eventually knows that player 2’s beliefs have
nearly converged. Coupled with discounting, this ensures that deviations from the commitment
strategy have virtually no effect on the payoffs from continuation play (though we impose no
“Markov” restriction on strategies). But the long-run effect of many such deviations from the
commitment strategy would be to drive the equilibrium to full revelation. Public reputations
5can thus be maintained only if the gains from deviating from the commitment strategy are ar-
bitrarily small, that is, only if the reputation is for behavior that is part of an equilibrium of the
complete-information game corresponding to the long-lived player’s type.3
The situation is more complicated in the private-reputation case, where player 2’s beliefs
are not known by player 1. Now, player 1 may not know when deviations from the commitment
strategy have relatively little effect on beliefs and hence are relatively costless. Making the
leap from the preceding intuition to our main result thus requires showing that there is a set
of histories under which player 2’s beliefs have nearly converged, and under which player 1 is
eventually relatively certain player 2 has such beliefs.
In general, one cannot expect player 1’s beliefs about player 2’s beliefs to be very accurate
when the latter depend on private histories. A key step in our proof is to show that whenever
player 2’s private history induces him to act as if he is convinced of some important characteris-
tic of player 1, eventually player 1 must become convinced that such a private history did indeed
occur (Lemma 3). In particular, if this private history ensured that player 2 is almost convinced
that he faces a commitment type, and acts on this belief, then this eventually becomes known to
player 1.
As in the case where player 1’s reputation is public, the impermanence of reputation also
arises at the behavioral level. Asymptotically, continuation play in every Nash equilibrium is a
correlated equilibrium of the complete-information game (Theorem 5). While the set of Nash
equilibrium payoffs in the game with complete information is potentially very large when player
3This argument does not carry over to repeated games without discounting, where small changes in beliefs,
with implications only for distant behavior, can still have large payoff implications.
62 is sufﬁciently patient (suggesting that limiting behavior to that set imposes few restrictions),
we emphasize that our analysis holds for all degrees of patience of the players. When player
2 is impatient, as in the extreme case of short-run player 2s, reputations can ensure payoffs for
player 1 that cannot be obtained under complete information. Our result (that limiting behavior
must be consistent with complete information) shows that this effect is transitory.
More importantly, reputation arguments are also of interest for their ability to restrict,
rather than expand, the set of equilibrium outcomes. For example, reputation arguments are
important in perfect-monitoring games with patient players, precisely because they impose tight
bounds on (rather than expanding) the set of equilibrium payoffs. Our results caution that one
cannot assume that such selection effects are long-lasting.
For expositional clarity, this paper considers a long-lived informed player who can be
one of two possible types—a commitment and a normal type—facing a single long-lived un-
informed player, in a game of imperfect public monitoring. The argument of Cripps, Mailath,
and Samuelson [4, Section 6.1] can be used to extend our results to many possible commitment
types. The ﬁnal section of this paper explains how our results can be extended to the case of
private monitoring (where reputations are necessarily private).
Our analysis subsumes a private-reputation model with a sequence of short-lived unin-
formed players. In several places, the arguments for the latter case are simpler and considerably
more revealing, primarily because we can then restrict attention to simpler commitment strate-
gies. Accordingly, where appropriate, we give the simpler argument for short-lived uninformed
players as well as the more involved argument for the long-lived uninformed player.
72 Reputation Games
2.1 Complete Information
We begin with an inﬁnitely repeated game with imperfect public monitoring. The stage game is
a two-player simultaneous-move ﬁnite game of public monitoring. Player 1 chooses an action
i 2 f1;2;:::;Ig ´ I and player 2 chooses an action j 2 f1;2;:::;Jg ´ J. The public signal, y,
is drawn from the ﬁnite set Y. The probability that y is realized under the action proﬁle (i; j)
is given by r
y
ij. The ex post stage-game payoff to player 1 (respectively, 2) from the action i
(resp., j) and signal y is given by f1(i;y) (resp., f2(j;y)). The ex ante stage game payoffs are
p1(i; j) = åy f1(i;y)r
y
ij and p2(i; j) = åy f2(j;y)r
y
ij.
Weassumethepublicsignalshavefullsupport(Assumption1), soeverysignalyispossible
after any action proﬁle. We also assume that with sufﬁciently many observations, either player
can correctly identify, from the frequencies of the signals, any ﬁxed stage-game action of their
opponent (Assumptions 2 and 3).
Assumption 1 (FULL SUPPORT) r
y
ij > 0 for all (i; j) 2 I£J and y 2Y.
Assumption 2 (IDENTIFICATION OF 1) For all j 2 J, the I columns in the matrix (r
y
ij)y2Y;i2I
are linearly independent.
Assumption 3 (IDENTIFICATION OF 2) For all i 2 I, the J columns in the matrix (r
y
ij)y2Y;j2J
are linearly independent.
The stage game is inﬁnitely repeated. Player 1 (“she”) is a long-lived player with discount
factor d1 < 1. Player 2 (“he”) is either short-lived, in which case a new player 2 appears in
8each period, or is also long-lived, in which case player 2’s discount factor d2 may differ from
d1. Each player observes the realizations of the public signal and his or her own past actions.
(If player 2 is short-lived, he observes the actions chosen by the previous player 2’s). Player 1
in period t thus has a private history, consisting of the public signals and her own past actions,
denoted by h1t ´ ((i0;y0);(i1;y1);:::;(it¡1;yt¡1)) 2 H1t ´ (I£Y)
t. Similarly, a private history
for player 2 is denoted h2t ´ ((j0;y0);(j1;y1);:::;(jt¡1;yt¡1)) 2 H2t ´ (J£Y)
t. The public
history observed by both players is the sequence (y0;y1;:::;yt¡1)2Yt. The ﬁltration on (I£J£
Y)¥ induced by the private histories of player ` = 1;2 is denoted fH`tg¥
t=0, while the ﬁltration
induced by the public histories (y0;y1;:::;yt¡1) is denoted fHtg¥
t=0.
In Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson [4], we assumed that the public signal included player
2’s action. This ensures that player 1 knows everything player 2 does, including player 2’s
beliefs. Here, only player 2 observes his action, breaking the link between 2’s beliefs and 1’s
beliefs about those beliefs.
The long-lived players’ payoffs in the inﬁnite horizon game are the average discounted
sum of stage-game payoffs, (1¡d`)å
¥
t=0dt
` p`(it; jt) for ` = 1;2. The random variable p`t
denotes average discounted payoffs in period t,
p`t ´ (1¡d`)
¥
å
t=t
dt¡t
` p`(it; jt): (1)
If player 2 is short-lived, the period-t player 2 has payoffs p2(it; jt).
A behavior strategy for player 1 (respectively, 2) is a map, s1 : [¥
t=0H1t ! DI (resp., s2 :
[¥
t=0H2t ! DJ), from all private histories to the set of distributions over current actions. For ` =
1;2, s` deﬁnes a sequence of functions fs`tg¥
t=0 with s1t : H1t ! DI and s2t : H2t ! DJ. Each
function s`t denotes the tth period behavior strategy of s`. The strategy proﬁle s = (s1;s2)
9induces a probability distribution Ps over (I £J £Y)¥. Let Es[ ¢ j H`t] denote player `’s
expectations with respect to this distribution conditional on H`t.
A Nash equilibrium for the case of two long-lived players requires player `’s strategy to
maximize the expected value of p`0, the discounted value of payoffs in period zero:
Deﬁnition 1 A Nash equilibrium of the complete-information game with a long-lived player 2
is a strategy proﬁle s = (s1;s2) such that Es[p10] ¸ E(s0
1;s2)[p10] for all s0
1 and Es[p20] ¸
E(s1;s0
2)[p20] for all s0
2.
This requires that under the equilibrium proﬁle, player `’s strategy maximizes continuation ex-
pected utility after any positive-probability history. For example, for player 1, Es[p1tjH1t] ¸
E(s0
1;s2)[p1tjH1t] Ps-almost surely for all s0
1 and all t. The assumption of full-support monitor-
ing ensures that all histories of public signals occur with positive probability, and hence must
be followed by optimal behavior in any Nash equilibrium (with long-lived or short-lived player
2’s, and complete or incomplete information). Consequently, any Nash equilibrium outcome is
also the outcome of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
For future reference, when player 2 is long-lived,
BRL(s1) ´ fs2 : Es[p20] ¸ E(s1;s0
2)[p20] 8s0
2g
is the set of player 2’s best replies to s1 in the game with complete information.
When player 2 is short-lived, in equilibrium, player 2 plays a best response after every
equilibrium history. Player 2’s strategy s2 is then a best response to s1 if, for all t,
Es[ p2(it; jt) j H2t] ¸ Es[ p2(it; j) j H2t]; 8j 2 J Ps-a.s.
10Denote the set of such best responses by BRS(s1). The deﬁnition of a Nash equilibrium for this
case is:
Deﬁnition 2 A Nash equilibrium of the complete-information game with a short-lived player
2 is a strategy proﬁle s = (s1;s2) such that Es[p10] ¸ E(s0
1;s2)[p10] for all s0
1 and such that
s2 2 BRS(s1).
2.2 Incomplete Information
We now perturb the complete-information game by introducing incomplete information about
the type of player 1. At time t = ¡1, Nature selects a type of player 1. With probability
1¡ p0 > 0, she is the “normal” type, denoted by n and with the preferences described above,
who plays a repeated game strategy ˜ s1. With probability p0 > 0, she is a “commitment” type,
denoted by c, who plays the repeated game strategy ˆ s1.
A state of the world in the incomplete information game, w, is a type for player 1 and a
sequence of actions and signals. The set of states is W ´ fn;cg£(I£J£Y)
¥. The prior p0,
the commitment strategy ˆ s1, and the strategy proﬁle ˜ s = ( ˜ s1;s2), jointly induce a probability
measure P on W, which describes how an uninformed player expects play to evolve. The strat-
egy proﬁle ˆ s = ( ˆ s1;s2) (respectively, ˜ s = ( ˜ s1;s2)) determines a probability measure ˆ P (resp.,
˜ P) on W, which describes how play evolves when player 1 is the commitment (resp., normal)
type. Since ˜ P and ˆ P are absolutely continuous with respect to P, any statement that holds P-
almost surely, also holds ˜ P- and ˆ P-almost surely. We use E( ˜ s1; ˆ s1;s2)[¢ ] to denote expectations
taken with respect to the measure P. This will usually be abbreviated to E[¢ ] except where it
is important to emphasize the dependence on the strategies. Also, where appropriate, we use
11˜ E[¢ ] and ˆ E[¢ ] to denote the expectations taken with respect to ˜ P and ˆ P (instead of E( ˜ s1;s2)[¢ ]
and E( ˆ s1;s2)[¢ ]). The ﬁltrations fH`tg¥
t=0 and fHtg¥
t=0 will be viewed as ﬁltrations on W in the
obvious way.
The normal type of player 1 has the same objective function as in the complete-information
game. Player 2, on the other hand, uses the information he has acquired from his time t private
history to update his beliefs about player 1’s type and actions, and then maximizes expected
payoffs. Player 2’s posterior belief in period t that player 1 is the commitment type is the
H2t-measurable random variable P(cjH2t) ´ pt : W ! [0;1]. By Assumption 1, Bayes’ rule
determinesthisposteriorafterallhistories. AtanyNashequilibriumofthisgame, thebelief pt is
a bounded martingale with respect to the ﬁltration fH2tgt and measure P. It therefore converges
P-almost surely (and hence ˜ P- and ˆ P-almost surely) to a random variable p¥ deﬁned on W.
Furthermore, at any equilibrium the posterior pt is a ˆ P-submartingale and a ˜ P-supermartingale
with respect to the ﬁltration fH2tgt.
3 Disappearing Reputations
Sections 3.1 and 3.2 present our disappearing reputation results, whose proofs are deferred to
Section 4, while Sections 3.3–3.5 present extensions and implications.
3.1 Uninformed Player is Short-Lived
When player 2 is short-lived, and we are interested in the lower bounds on player 1’s ex ante
payoffs that arise from the existence of “Stackelberg” commitment types (as in Fudenberg and
Levine [6]), it sufﬁces to consider commitment types who follow “simple” strategies. Conse-
12quently, when player 2 is short-lived, we assume ˆ s1 speciﬁes the same (possibly mixed) action
V1 2 DI in each period independent of history (cf. Deﬁnition 4 below).
If V1 is part of a stage-game equilibrium, reputations need not disappear—we need only
consider an equilibrium in which the normal and commitment type both play V1, and player 2
plays his part of the corresponding equilibrium. We are interested in commitment types who
play a strategy that is not part of a stage-game equilibrium:4
Assumption 4 (NON-CREDIBLE COMMITMENT) Player 2 has a unique best reply to V1 (de-
noted V2) and V ´ (V1;V2) is not a stage-game Nash equilibrium.
Since V2 is the unique best response to V1, the action V2 is pure and BRS( ˆ s1) is the singleton
f ˆ s2g, where ˆ s2 is the strategy of playing V2 in every period. Assumption 4 implies that ( ˆ s1; ˆ s2)
is not a Nash equilibrium of the complete-information inﬁnite horizon game.
Deﬁnition 3 A Nash equilibrium of the incomplete-information game with short-lived unin-
formed players is a strategy proﬁle ( ˜ s1;s2) such that for all s0
1, j 2 J and t = 0;1;:::,
˜ E[p10] ¸ E(s0
1;s2)[p10]; and
E[ p2(it; jt) j H2t] ¸ E[ p2(it; j) j H2t]; P¡a:s:
Our main result, for short-lived uninformed players, is that reputations for non-equilibrium
behavior are temporary:
4If player 2 has multiple best responses, it is possible to construct equilibria of the complete information game
in which player 1 plays V1 in each period, irrespective of history, even if V1 is not part of a stage-game equilibrium
(for an example, see Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson [4, Section 2]).
13Theorem 1 Suppose the monitoring distribution r satisﬁes Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 and the
commitment action V1 satisﬁes Assumption 4. In any Nash equilibrium of the incomplete-
information game with short-lived uninformed players, pt ! 0 ˜ P-almost surely.
3.2 Uninformed Player is Long-Lived
When player 2 is long-lived, non-simple Stackelberg types may give rise to higher lower bounds
on player 1’s payoff than do simple types. We accordingly introduce a richer set of possible
commitment types, allowing arbitrary public strategies.
Deﬁnition 4 (1) A behavior strategy s`, `=1;2, is public if it is measurable with respect to the
ﬁltration induced by the public signals, fHtgt.
(2) A behavior strategy s`, ` = 1;2, is simple if it is a constant function.
A public strategy induces a mixture over actions in each period that only depends on public
histories. Any pure strategy is realization equivalent to a public strategy. Simple strategies,
which we associated with the commitment type in Section 3.1, play the same mixture over
stage-game actions in each period, and hence are trivially public.
Allowing the commitment type to play any public strategy necessitates imposing the non-
credibility requirement directly on the inﬁnitely repeated game of complete information. Mim-
icking Assumption 4, we require that (i) player 2’s best response ˆ s2 be unique on the equi-
librium path and (ii) there exists a ﬁnite time To such that, for every t > To, a normal player
1 would almost surely want to deviate from ˆ s1, given player 2’s best response. That is, there
is a period-t continuation strategy for player 1 that strictly increases her utility. A strategy ˆ s1
14satisfying these criteria at least eventually loses its credibility, and hence is said to have “no
long-run credibility.”
Deﬁnition 5 The strategy ˆ s1 has no long-run credibility if there exists To and eo > 0 such that,
for every t ¸ To,
(1) ˆ s2 2 BRL( ˆ s1) implies that with P( ˆ s1; ˆ s2)-probability one, ˆ s2t is pure and
E ˆ s [ p2t j H2t ] > E( ˆ s1;s0
2)[ p2t j H2t ]+eo;
for all s0
2 attaching probability zero to the action played by ˆ s2t(h2t) after P( ˆ s1; ˆ s2)-almost all
h2t 2 H2t, and
(2) there exists ˜ s1 such that, for ˆ s2 2 BRL( ˆ s1), P( ˆ s1; ˆ s2)-almost surely,
E( ˜ s1; ˆ s2)[ p1t j H1t ] > E ˆ s [ p1t j H1t ]+eo:
This deﬁnition captures the two main features of Assumption 4, a unique best response and
absence of equilibrium, in a dynamic setting. In particular, the stage-game action of any simple
strategy satisfying Deﬁnition 5 satisﬁes Assumption 4. In assuming the best response is unique,
we need to avoid the possibility that there are multiple best responses to the commitment action
“in the limit” (as t gets large). We do so by imposing a uniformity condition in Deﬁnition
5.1, that inferior responses reduce payoffs by at least eo. The condition on the absence of
equilibrium in Deﬁnition 5.2 similarly ensures that for all large t, player 1 can strictly improve
on the commitment action. Again it is necessary to impose uniformity to avoid the possibility
of an equilibrium in the limit.5
5Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson [4] show that reputations disappear when the commitment strategy satisﬁes
the second, but not necessarily the ﬁrst, condition (such a strategy was said to be never an equilibrium strategy
15Any ˆ s1 that does not satisfy Deﬁnition 5 must have (at least in the limit) periods and histo-
ries where, given player 2 is best responding to ˆ s1, player 1 prefers to stick to her commitment
strategy. In other words, ˆ s1 is a credible commitment, in the limit, at least some of the time.
Deﬁnition 6 A Nash equilibrium of the incomplete-information game with a long-lived unin-
formed player is a strategy proﬁle ( ˜ s1;s2) such that,
˜ E[p10] ¸ E(s0
1;s2)[p10] ; 8s0
1; and
E[p20] ¸ E( ˜ s1; ˆ s1;s0
2)[p20]; 8s0
2:
Theorem 2, which implies Theorem 1, is our result for games where player 2 is long-lived:
Theorem 2 Suppose r satisﬁes Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, and that the commitment type’s strat-
egy ˆ s1 is public and has no long run credibility. Then in any Nash equilibrium of the game with
incomplete information, pt ! 0 ˜ P-almost surely.
Wehavefollowedthestandardpracticeofworkingwithcommitmenttypeswhosebehavior
is ﬁxed. If instead we modeled commitment types as strategic agents whose payoffs differed
from those of normal types, we would obtain the following: Under Assumptions 1–3, in any
Nash equilibrium in which the “commitment-payoff” type plays a public strategy with no long
run credibility for the “normal-payoff” type, pt ! 0 ˜ P-almost surely.
in the long run). However, that result also requires the commitment strategy to be implementable by a ﬁnite
automaton, and more problematically, the result itself imposed a condition on the behavior of player 2 in the
equilibrium of the game with incomplete information. We do neither here. Consequently, unlike our earlier paper,
the long-lived player result implies the result for short-lived players.
163.3 Uniform Disappearance of Reputations
Theorem 2 leaves open the possibility that while reputations do asymptotically disappear in ev-
ery equilibrium, for any period T, there may be equilibria in which reputations survive beyond
T. We show here that that possibility cannot arise: there is some T after which reputations
have disappeared in all Nash equilibria. Intuitively, a sequence of Nash equilibria with reputa-
tions persisting beyond period T ! ¥ implies the (contradictory) existence of a limiting Nash
equilibrium with a permanent reputation.
Theorem 3 Suppose r satisﬁes Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, and that the commitment type’s strat-
egy ˆ s1 is public and has no long run credibility. For all e > 0, there exists T, such that for all
Nash equilibria, s, of the game with incomplete information,
˜ Ps(ps
t < e; 8t > T) > 1¡e;
where ˜ Ps is the probability measure induced on W by s and the normal type, and ps
t is the
associated posterior of player 2 on the commitment type.
Proof. Suppose not. Then there exists e >0 such that for all T, there is a Nash equilibrium
sT such that
˜ PT(pT
t < e; 8t > T) · 1¡e;
where ˜ PT is the measure induced by the normal type under sT and pT
t is the posterior in period
t under sT.
Since the space of strategy proﬁles is sequentially compact in the product topology, there is
a convergent subsequence fsTkg, with limit s¤. We can relabel this sequence so that sk ! s¤
17and
˜ Pk(pk
t < e; 8t > k) · 1¡e;
i.e.,
˜ Pk(pk
t ¸ e for some t > k) ¸ e:
Since each sk is a Nash equilibrium, pk
t ! 0 ˜ Pk-a.s. (Theorem 2), and so there exists
Kk > k such that
˜ Pk(pk
t < e; 8t ¸ Kk) ¸ 1¡e=2:
Consequently, for all k,
˜ Pk(pk
t ¸ e; for some t; k <t < Kk) ¸ e=2:
Let tk denote the stopping time
tk = minft > k : pk
t ¸ eg;
and qk
t the associated stopped process,
qk
t =
8
> > <
> > :
pk
t; if t < tk;
e; if t ¸ tk:
Note that qk
t is a supermartingale under ˜ Pk and that for t < k, qk
t = pk
t.
Observe that for all k and t ¸ Kk,
˜ Ekqk
t ¸ e ˜ Pk(tk ·t) ¸ e2=2:
Since s¤ is a Nash equilibrium, p¤
t ! 0 ˜ P¤-a.s. (appealing to Theorem 2 again), and so
there exists a date s such that
˜ P¤(p¤
s < e2=12) > 1¡e2=12:
18Then,
˜ E¤p¤
s ·
e2
12
(1¡
e2
12
)+
e2
12
<
e2
6
:
Since sk ! s¤ in the product topology, there is a k0 > s such that for all k ¸ k0,
˜ Ekpk
s <
e2
3
:
But since k0 > s, qk
s = pk
s for k ¸ k0 and so for any t ¸ Kk,
e2
3
> ˜ Ekpk
s = ˜ Ekqk
s
¸ ˜ Ekqk
t ¸
e2
2
; (2)
which is a contradiction.
3.4 Disappearing reputations in discounted ﬁnitely-repeated games
In this section we show that reputations also disappear in sufﬁciently long discounted ﬁnitely-
repeated games of incomplete information. If the commitment type plays a simple strategy of
playing V1 in every period, with V1 satisfying Assumption 4, then the description of the ﬁnitely
repeated game for differing repetitions is straightforward: The commitment type plays V1 in
every period. More generally, if ˆ sT
1 is the commitment type’s strategy in the T-period game,
we require that the sequence f ˆ sT
1 g converge to a strategy ˆ s1 of the inﬁnitely repeated game that
has no long-run credibility.
Theorem 4 Suppose r satisﬁes Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, and ˆ s1 is a public strategy of the
inﬁnitely repeated game with no long run credibility. Let GT denote the T-period discounted
repeated game of incomplete information in which the commitment type plays according to ˆ sT
1 .
19Suppose for all t, ˆ sT
1t ! ˆ s1t as T ! ¥. For all e > 0, there exists T such that for all T0 ¸ T and
for all Nash equilibria s of GT0
,
˜ Ps(ps
t < e; 8t ¸ T) > 1¡e;
where ˜ Ps is the probability measure induced on (I£J£Y)
T0
by s and the normal type, and
ps
t is the associated posterior of player 2 on the commitment type.
Proof. Suppose not. Then there exists e > 0, such that for all T, there exists T0 ¸ T and a
Nash equilibrium sT of the T0-period ﬁnitely repeated game with
˜ PT(pT
t < e; 8t ¸ T) · 1¡e;
where ˜ PT is the probability measure induced in the T0-period repeated game by sT and the
normal type, and pT
t is the associated posterior.
A standard diagonalization argument yields a subsequence fsTkg and a strategy proﬁle
in the inﬁnitely repeated game, s¤, with the property that for all t, s
Tk
`t ! s¤
`t for ` = 1;2.6
Moreover, since each sTk is a Nash equilibrium of increasingly long ﬁnitely repeated games and
ˆ s
Tk
1t ! ˆ s1t, s¤ isaNashequilibriumoftheinﬁnitelyrepeatedgamewithincompleteinformation
in which the commitment type plays ˆ s1. We can relabel this sequence so that sk
t ! s¤
t for each
t and
˜ Pk(pk
t < e; 8t > k) · 1¡e:
Letting Tk be the length of the ﬁnitely repeated game corresponding to sk, we have (recall that
the initial period is period 0)
˜ Pk(pk
t ¸ e; for some t; k <t < Tk) ¸ e:
6For each t, s
Tk
t and s¤
t are elements of the same ﬁnite dimensional Euclidean space.
20The proof now proceeds as that of Theorem 3, with (2) evaluated at t = Tk¡1.
3.5 Asymptotic Equilibrium Play
The impermanence of reputations has implications for behavior as well as beliefs. In the
limit, the normal type of player 1 and player 2 play a correlated equilibrium of the complete-
information game. Hence, differences in the players’ beliefs about how play will continue
vanish in the limit. This is stronger than the convergence to subjective equilibria obtained by
Kalai and Lehrer [11, Corollary 4.4.1],7 though with stronger assumptions.
We present the result for the case of a long-run player 2, since only straightforward modi-
ﬁcations are required (imposing the appropriate optimality conditions period-by-period) to ad-
dress short-run player 2’s. To begin, we describe some notation for the correlated equilibrium
of the repeated game with imperfect monitoring. We use the term period-t continuation game
for the game with initial period in period t.8 We use the notation t0 = 0;1;2;::: for a period of
play in a continuation game (which may be the original game) and t for the time elapsed prior
to the start of the period-t continuation game. A pure strategy for player 1, s1, is a sequence
of maps s1t0 : H1t0 ! I for t0 = 0;1;:::.9 Thus, s1t0 2 IH1t0 and s1 2 I[t0H1t0 ´ S1, and similarly
s2 2S2 ´J[t0H2t0. The spaces S1 and S2 are countable products of ﬁnite sets. We equip the prod-
7In a subjective correlated equilibrium, the measure in (3) can differ from the measure in (4).
8Sinceastrategyproﬁleoftheoriginalgameinducesaprobabilitydistributionovert-periodhistories, H1t£H2t,
we can view the period t continuation, together with a type space H1t £H2t and induced distribution on that type
space, as a Bayesian game. Different strategy proﬁles in the original game induce different distributions over the
type space in the continuation game.
9Recall that s1 denotes general behavior strategies.
21uct space S ´ S1£S2 with the s-algebra generated by the cylinder sets, denoted by S. Denote
the players’ payoffs in the inﬁnitely repeated game (as a function of these pure strategies) as
follows
u1(s1;s2) ´ E(s1;s2)[ p10 ]; and
u2(s1;s2) ´ E(s1;s2)[ p20 ]:
The expectation above is taken over the action pairs (it0; jt0). These are random, given the pure
strategy proﬁle (s1;s2), because the pure action played in period t0 depends upon the random
public signals.
We follow Hart and Schmeidler [9] in using the ex ante deﬁnition of correlated equilibria
for inﬁnite pure-strategy sets:
Deﬁnition 7 A correlated equilibrium of the complete-information game is a measure m on
(S;S) such that for all S-measurable functions z1 : S1 ! S1 and z2 : S2 ! S2,
Z
S
[u1(s1;s2)¡u1(z1(s1);s2)]dm ¸ 0; and (3)
Z
S
[u2(s1;s2)¡u2(s1;z2(s2))]dm ¸ 0: (4)
Let M denote the space of probability measures m on (S;S), equipped with the product
topology. Then, a sequence mn converges to m if, for each t ¸ 0, we have
mnjI(I£Y)t£J(J£Y)t ! mjI(I£Y)t£J(J£Y)t:
Moreover, M is sequentially compact with this topology. Payoffs for players 1 and 2 are
extended to M in the obvious way. Since payoffs are discounted, the product topology is
22strong enough to guarantee continuity of u` : M !R. The set of mixed strategies for player `
is denoted by M`.
Fix an equilibrium of the incomplete-information game with imperfect monitoring. When
player 1 is the normal (respectively, commitment) type, the monitoring technology and the
behavior strategies ( ˜ s1;s2) (resp., ( ˆ s1;s2)) induce a probability measure ˜ ft (resp., ˆ ft) on the
t-period histories (h1t;h2t) 2 H1t £H2t. If the normal type of player 1 observes a private history
h1t 2 H1t, her strategy, ˜ s1, speciﬁes a behavior strategy in the period-t continuation game.
This behavior strategy is realization equivalent to a mixed strategy ˜ lh1t 2 M1 for the period-t
continuation game. Similarly, the commitment type will play a mixed strategy ˆ lh1t 2 M1 for
the continuation game and player 2 will form his posterior pt(h2t) and play the mixed strategy
lh2t 2 M2 in the continuation game. Conditional on player 1 being normal, the composition of
the probability measure ˜ ft and the measures (˜ lh1t;lh2t) induces a joint probability measure, ˜ rt,
on the pure strategies in the continuation game and player 2’s posterior (the space S£[0;1]).
Similarly, conditional upon player 1 being the commitment type, there is a measure ˆ rt on S£
[0;1]. Let ˜ mt denote the marginal of ˜ rt on S and ˆ mt denote the marginal of ˆ rt on S.
At the ﬁxed equilibrium, the normal type is playing in an optimal way from time t onwards
given her available information. This implies that for all S-measurable functions z1 : S1 ! S1,
Z
S
u1(s1;s2)d ˜ mt ¸
Z
S
u1(z1(s1);s2)d ˜ mt: (5)
Let S £B denote the product s-algebra on S£[0;1] generated by S on S and the Borel s-
algebra on [0;1]. Player 2 is also playing optimally from time t onwards, which implies that for
23all S £B-measurable functions x2 : S2£[0;1] ! S2,
Z
S£[0;1]
u2(s1;s2)d(p0 ˆ rt +(1¡ p0)˜ rt) ¸
Z
S£[0;1]
u2(s1;x2(s2;pt))d(p0 ˆ rt +(1¡ p0)˜ rt): (6)
If we had metrized M, a natural formalization of the idea that asymptotically, the normal
type and player 2 are playing a correlated equilibrium is that the distance between the set of
correlated equilibria and the induced equilibrium distributions ˜ mt on S goes to zero. While
M is metrizable, a simpler and equivalent formulation is that the limit of every convergent
subsequence of f˜ mtg is a correlated equilibrium. This equivalence is an implication of the fact
that M is sequentially compact, and hence every subsequence of f˜ mtg has a convergent sub-
subsequence. The proof of the following theorem is in Appendix A.1.
Theorem 5 Fix a Nash equilibrium of the incomplete-information game and suppose pt ! 0
˜ P-almost surely. Let ˜ mt denote the distribution on S induced in periodt by the Nash equilibrium.
The limit of every convergent subsequence of f˜ mtg is a correlated equilibrium of the complete-
information game.
Since players have access to a coordination device, namely histories, in general it is not
true that Nash equilibrium play of the incomplete-information game eventually looks like Nash
equilibrium play of the complete-information game.10
10We do not know if Nash equilibrium play in the incomplete-information game eventually looks like a public
randomization over Nash equilibrium play in the complete-information game. As far as we are aware, it is also not
known whether the result of Fudenberg and Levine [7, Theorem 6.1, part (iii)] extends to correlated equilibrium.
That is, for moral hazard mixing games and for large d, is it true that the long-run player’s maximum correlated
equilibrium payoff is lower than when monitoring is perfect?
24Suppose the Stackelberg payoff is not a correlated equilibrium payoff of the complete-
information game. Recall that Fudenberg and Levine [6] provide a lower bound on equilibrium
payoffs in the incomplete-information game (with short-run players) of the following type:
Fix the prior probability of the Stackelberg (commitment) type. Then, there is a value for the
discount factor, ¯ d, such that if d1 > ¯ d, then in every Nash equilibrium, the long-lived player’s
ex ante payoff is essentially no less than the Stackelberg payoff. The reconciliation of this result
with Theorem 5 lies in the order of quantiﬁers: while Fudenberg and Levine [6] ﬁx the prior,
p0, and then select ¯ d (p0) large (with ¯ d (p0) ! 1 as p0 ! 0), we ﬁx d1 and examine asymptotic
play, so that eventually pt is sufﬁciently small that d1 < ¯ d (pt).
4 Proofs of Theorems 1 and 2
The short-lived uninformed player case is a special case of the long-lived player case. How-
ever, the proof for the long-lived uninformed player is quite complicated, while the short-lived
player case illustrates many of the issues in a simpler setting. In what follows, references to the
incomplete information game without further qualiﬁcation refer to the game with the long-lived
uninformed player, and so the discussion also covers short-lived uninformed players (where
ˆ s1(hs) = V1 for all hs). Whenever it is helpful, however, we also give informative simpler argu-
ments for the case of short-lived uninformed players.
The basic strategy of our proof is to show that if player 2 is not eventually convinced that
player 1 is normal, then he must be convinced that player 1 is playing like the commitment type
(Lemma 1) and hence player 2 plays a best response to the latter. Our earlier paper proceeded
by arguing that the normal type then has an incentive to deviate from the commitment strategy
25(since the latter has no long-run credibility), which forms the basis for a contradiction (with
player 2’s belief that the two types of player 1 are playing identically). The difﬁculty in applying
thisargumentin our current setting is that player 1 needsto knowplayer 2’sprivatehistory h2t in
order to predict 2’s period-t beliefs and hence behavior. Unfortunately, player 1 knows only her
own private history h1t. Our argument thus requires showing that player 1 eventually “almost”
knows the relevant features of player 2’s history.
4.1 Player 2’s Posterior Beliefs
The ﬁrst step is to show that either player 2’s expectation (given his private history) of the
strategy played by the normal type is, in the limit, identical to his expectation of the strategy
played by the commitment type, or player 2’s posterior probability that player 1 is the commit-
ment type converges to zero (given that player 1 is indeed normal). This is an extension of a
familiar merging-style argument to the case of imperfect monitoring. If, for a given private his-
tory for player 2, the distributions generating his observations are different for the normal and
commitment types, then he will be updating his posterior, continuing to do so as the posterior
approaches zero. His posterior converges to something strictly positive only if the distributions
generating these observations are in the limit identical for each private history.
The proof of Lemma 1 in Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson [4] applies to the current setting
without change:
Lemma 1 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisﬁed and ˆ s1 is public. In any Nash equilibrium
26of the game with incomplete information,11
lim
t!¥
pt(1¡ pt)
°
° ˆ s1t ¡ ˜ E[ ˜ s1t j H2t ]
°
° = 0; P-a.s. (7)
Condition (7) says that almost surely either player 2’s best prediction of the normal type’s
behavior at the current stage is arbitrarily close to his best prediction of the commitment type’s
behavior (that is, k ˆ s1t ¡ ˜ E[ ˜ s1t j H2t ] k ! 0), or the type is revealed (that is, pt(1¡ pt) ! 0).
However, limpt < 1 ˜ P-almost surely, and hence (7) implies a simple corollary:
Corollary 1 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisﬁed and ˆ s1 is public. In any Nash equilib-
rium of the game with incomplete information,
lim
t!¥
pt
°
° ˆ s1t ¡ ˜ E[ ˜ s1t j H2t ]
°
° = 0; ˜ P-a.s.
4.2 Player 2’s Beliefs about his Future Behavior
We now examine the consequences of the existence of a ˜ P-positive measure set of states on
which reputations do not disappear, i.e., limt!¥ pt(w) > 0. The normal and the commitment
types eventually play the same strategy on these states (Lemma 1). Consequently, we can show
that on a positive probability subset of these states, player 2 eventually attaches high probability
to the event that in all future periods he will play a best response to the commitment type.
As ˆ s1 is public, player 2 has a best response to ˆ s1 that is also public. Moreover, this
best response is unique on the equilibrium path for all t > To (by Deﬁnition 5). We let j¤(ht)
denote the action that is the pure best-response after the public history ht, for all t > To. Note
that j¤(ht) is Ht-measurable. The event that player 2 plays a best response to the commitment
11We use kxk to denote the sup-norm on RI.
27strategy in all periods after t > To is then deﬁned as
Go
t ´ fw : s
j¤(hs(w))
2s (h2s(w)) = 1;8s ¸tg;
where hs(w) (respectively, h2s(w)) is the s-period public (resp., 2’s private) history of w.
When the uninformed players are short-lived, ˆ s1 is simple and player 2 has a unique best
reply, BRS(V1) = fV2g, so
Go
t = fw : s2s(h2s(w)) = V2;8s ¸tg:
With this in hand we can show that if player 2 does not eventually learn that player 1 is
normal, then he eventually attaches high probability to thereafter playing a best response to the
commitment type:
Lemma 2 Suppose the hypotheses of Theorem 2 hold,12 and suppose there is a Nash equilib-
rium in which reputations do not necessarily disappear, i.e., ˜ P(A) > 0, where A ´ fpt 9 0g.
There exists h > 0 and F ½A, with ˜ P(F) >0, such that, for any x > 0, there exists T for which,
on F,
pt > h; 8t ¸ T;
and
˜ P(Go
t j H2t) > 1¡x; 8t ¸ T: (8)
Proof. Since ˜ P(A) > 0 and pt converges almost surely, there exists m > 0 and h > 0
such that ˜ P(D) > 2m, where D ´ fw : limt!¥ pt(w) > 2hg. The random variables k ˆ s1s ¡
˜ E[ ˜ s1tjH2t]k tend ˜ P-almost surely to zero on D (by Corollary 1). Consequently, the random
12This lemma does not require Assumption 3.
28variables Zt ´ sups¸t k ˆ s1s ¡ ˜ E[ ˜ s1sjH2s]k also converge ˜ P-almost surely to zero on D. Thus,
from Hart [8, Lemma 4.24], ˜ E[1DZt j H2t] converges almost surely to zero, where 1D is the
indicator for the event D. Deﬁne At ´ fw : ˜ E[1D j H2t](w) > 1
2g. The H2t-measurable event At
approximates D (because player 2 knows his own beliefs, the random variables dt ´ j1D¡1Atj
converge ˜ P-almost surely to zero). Hence
1D ˜ E[Zt j H2t] · 1At ˜ E[Zt j H2t]+dt
= ˜ E[1AtZt j H2t]+dt
· ˜ E[1DZt j H2t]+ ˜ E[dt j H2t]+dt;
where the ﬁrst and third lines use Zt ·1 and the second uses the measurability of At with respect
to H2t. All the terms on the last line converge ˜ P-almost surely to zero, and so ˜ E[ZtjH2t] ! 0
˜ P-a.s. on the set D. Egorov’s Theorem (Chung [2, p. 74]) then implies that there exists F ½ D
such that ˜ P(F) > 0 on which the convergence of pt and ˜ E[ZtjH2t] is uniform.
To clarify the remainder of the argument, we present here the case of short-lived player 2
(long-lived player 2 is discussed in Appendix A.2). This case is particularly simple, because if
player 2 believed his opponent was “almost” the commitment type, then in each period 2 plays
the same equilibrium action as if he was certain he was facing the commitment simple type.
From the upper semi-continuity of the best response correspondence, there exists y > 0
such that for any history h1s and any z1 2 DI satisfying kz1¡V1k · y, a best response to z1 is
also a best response to V1, and so necessarily equals V2. The uniform convergence of ˜ E[ZtjH2t]
on F implies that, for any x > 0, there exists a time T such that on F, for all t > T, pt > h and
29(since ˆ s1s = V1)
˜ E
·
sup
s¸t
°
°V1¡ ˜ E[ ˜ s1sjH2s]
°
°
¯
¯
¯
¯H2t
¸
< xy:
As ˜ E[ZtjH2t] < xy for all t > T on F and Zt ¸ 0, ˜ P(fZt > ygjH2t) < x for all t > T on F,
implying (8).
4.3 Player 1’s Beliefs about Player 2’s Future Behavior
Our next step is to show that, with positive probability, player 1 eventually expects player 2
to play a best response to the commitment type for the remainder of the game. We ﬁrst show
that, while player 2’s private history h2t is typically of use to player 1 in predicting 2’s period-s
behavior for s>t, this usefulness vanishes as s!¥. The intuition is straightforward. If period-
s behavior is eventually (as s becomes large) independent of h2t, then clearly h2t is eventually
of no use in predicting that behavior. Suppose then that h2t is essential to predicting player 2’s
behavior in all periods s >t. Then, player 1 continues to receive information about this history
from subsequent observations, reducing the value of having h2t explicitly revealed. As time
passes player 1 will ﬁgure out whether h2t actually occurred from her own observations, again
reducing the value of independently knowing h2t.
Denote by b(A ;B) the smallest s-algebra containing the s-algebras A and B: Thus,
b (H1s;H2t) is the s-algebra describing player 1’s information at time s if she were to learn
the private history of player 2 at time t.
Lemma 3 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 3 hold. For any t > 0 and t ¸ 0,
lim
s!¥
°
° ˜ E[s2;s+tjb(H1s;H2t)]¡ ˜ E[s2;s+tjH1s]
°
° = 0; ˜ P-a.s.
30Proof. We prove the result here for t = 0. The case of t ¸ 1 is proved by induction in
Appendix A.3. Suppose K ½ Jt is a set of t-period player 2 action proﬁles (j0; j1;:::; jt¡1). We
also denote by K the corresponding event (i.e., subset of W). By Bayes’ rule and the ﬁniteness
of the action and signal spaces, we can write the conditional probability of the event K given
the observation by player 1 of h1;s+1 = (h1s;ys;is) as follows
˜ P[Kjh1;s+1] = ˜ P[Kjh1s;ys;is]
=
˜ P[Kjh1s] ˜ P[ys;isjK;h1s]
˜ P[ys;isjh1s]
=
˜ P[Kjh1s]åjr
ys
is j ˜ E[s
j
2(h2s)jK;h1s]
åjr
ys
is j ˜ E[s
j
2(h2s)jh1s]
;
where the last equality uses ˜ P[isjK;h1s] = ˜ P[isjh1s].
Subtract ˜ P[Kjh1s] from both sides to obtain
˜ P[Kjh1;s+1]¡ ˜ P[Kjh1s] =
˜ P[Kjh1s]åjr
ys
is j
³
˜ E[s
j
2(h2s)jK;h1s]¡ ˜ E[s
j
2(h2s)jh1s]
´
åjr
ys
is j ˜ E[s
j
2(h2s)jh1s]
:
The term åjr
ys
is j ˜ E[s
j
2(h2s)jh1s] is player 1’s conditional probability of observing the period-s
signal ys given she takes action is and hence is strictly positive and less than one by Assumption
1. Thus,
¯
¯ ˜ P[Kjh1;s+1]¡ ˜ P[Kjh1s]
¯
¯ ¸ ˜ P[Kjh1s]
¯
¯
¯
¯
¯å
j
r
ys
is j
³
˜ E[s
j
2(h2s)jK;h1s]¡ ˜ E[s
j
2(h2s)jh1s]
´
¯
¯
¯
¯
¯
:
Since the sequence of random variables f ˜ P[KjH1s]gs is a martingale relative to (fH1sgs; ˜ P), it
converges ˜ P-almost surely to a non-negative limit ˜ P[KjH1¥] as s ! ¥. Consequently, the left
side of this inequality converges ˜ P-almost surely to zero. The signals generated by player 2’s
actions satisfy Assumption 3, so an identical argument to that given at the end of the proof of
31Lemma 1 in Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson [4] establishes that ˜ P-almost everywhere on K,
lim
s!¥
˜ P[KjH1s]
°
° ˜ E[s2sjb (H1s;K)]¡ ˜ E[s2sjH1s]
°
° = 0,
where b (A ;B) is the smallest s-algebra containing both the s-algebra A and the event B.
Moreover, ˜ P[KjH1¥](w) > 0 for ˜ P-almost all w 2 K. Thus, ˜ P-almost everywhere on K,
lim
s!¥
°
° ˜ E[s2sjb(H1s;K)]¡ ˜ E[s2sjH1s]
°
° = 0:
Since this holds for all K 2 H2t,
lim
s!¥
k ˜ E[s2sjb(H1s;H2t)]¡ ˜ E[s2sjH1s]k = 0; ˜ P-a.s.;
giving the result for t = 0.
Now we apply Lemma 3 to a particular piece of information player 2 could have at time
t. By Lemma 2, with positive probability, we reach a time t at which player 2 assigns high
probability to the event that all his future behavior is a best reply to the commitment type.
Intuitively, by Lemma 3, these period-t beliefs of player 2 about his own future behavior will,
eventually, become known to player 1.
This step is motivated by the observation that, if player 1 eventually expects player 2 to al-
ways play a best response to the commitment type, then the normal type of player 1 will choose
to deviate from the behavior of the commitment type (which is not a best response to player
2’s best response to the commitment type). At this point, we appear to have a contradiction
between player 2’s belief on the event F (from Lemma 2) that the normal and commitment
types are playing identically and player 1’s behavior on the event F† (the event where player 1
expects player 2 to always play a best response to the commitment type, identiﬁed in the next
32lemma). This contradiction would be immediate if F† was both a subset of F and measurable
for player 2. Unfortunately we have no reason to expect either. However, the next lemma shows
that F† is in fact close to a H2s-measurable set on which player 2’s beliefs that player 1 is the
commitment type do not converge to zero. In this case we will (eventually) have a contradic-
tion: On all such histories, the normal and commitment types are playing identically. However,
nearly everywhere on a relatively large subset of these states, player 1 is deviating from the
commitment strategy in an identiﬁable way.
Recall that j¤(hs) is the action played for sure in period s after the public history hs by
player 2’s best response to the commitment type. Hence, ˜ E[s
j¤(hs0)
2s0 jH1s] is the probability
player 1 assigns in period s to the event that 2 best responds to the commitment type in period
s0 ¸ s. For the case of the short-lived uninformed players and the simple commitment type,
j¤(hs) = V2 for all hs,13 and so
°
° ˜ E[s2s0jH1s]¡V2
°
° ¸ 1¡ ˜ E[s
j¤(hs0)
2s0 jH1s]. So, in that case, (12)
implies
°
° ˜ E[s2s0jH1s]¡V2
°
° < n. Section A.4 contains the proof of the following lemma.
Lemma 4 Suppose the hypotheses of Theorem 2 hold, and suppose there is a Nash equilibrium
in which reputations do not necessarily disappear, i.e., ˜ P(fpt 9 0g) > 0. Let h > 0 be the
constant and F the positive probability event identiﬁed in Lemma 2. For any n > 0 and number
of periods t > 0, there exists an event F† and a time T(n;t) such that for all s > T(n;t) there
exists C†
s 2 H2s with:
ps > h on C†
s; (9)
F†[F ½C†
s; (10)
˜ P(F†) > ˜ P(C†
s)¡n ˜ P(F); (11)
13Here we use V2 to denote the pure action receiving probability one under V2.
33and for any s0 2 fs;s+1;:::;s+tg, on F†,
˜ E[ s
j¤(hs0)
2s0 j H1s ] > 1¡n; ˜ P-a.s. (12)
When player 2 is long-lived, it will be convenient to know that the conclusions of Lemma
4 hold on a sequence of cylinder sets:
Corollary 2 Assume the conditions of Lemma 4. Deﬁne F†
s = fw 2 W : projs(w) = projs(w0)
for some w0 2 F†g, where projs(w) is the projection of w onto (I£J£Y)
s. Then, (10), (11),
and (12) hold for F†
s replacing F†.
Proof. The proof follows from the observation that, for all s, F† ½ F†
s ½ C†
s (since C†
s 2
H2s) and (12) is an H1s-measurable condition.
4.4 Toward a Contradiction
We have shown that when reputations do not necessarily disappear, there exists a set F† on
which (12) holds and F† ½ C†
s 2 H2s. The remaining argument is more transparent in the
setting of Theorem 1, where player 2 is short-lived. Accordingly, we ﬁrst prove Theorem 1, and
then give the distinct argument needed when player 2 is long-lived and the commitment strategy
is not simple.
In broad brushstrokes, the argument proving Theorem 1 is as follows. First, we conclude
that on F†, the normal type will not be playing the commitment strategy. To be precise—on
F† there will exist a stage-game action played by V1 but not by the normal type. This will bias
player 2’s expectation of the normal type’s actions away from the commitment strategy on C†
s,
because there is little probability weight on C†
s nF†. We then get a contradiction, because the
34fact that ps > h on C†
s implies player 2 must believe the commitment type’s strategy and the
normal type’s average strategy are the same on C†
s.
The argument proving Theorem 2 must deal with the nonstationary nature of the commit-
ment strategy (and the nonstationary nature of the failure of credibility). As in the simple case,
we have found a set of states F† where, for all s sufﬁciently large, the normal type attaches
high probability to player 2 best responding to the commitment type for the next t periods. The
normal type’s best response to this is not the commitment strategy, and hence the normal type
does not play the commitment strategy. We will derive a contradiction by showing that player
2 almost comes to know this.
The complication is that it may be very difﬁcult for player 2 to predict just how the normal
type’s strategy deviates from the commitment strategy. When working with the stationary com-
mitment strategy of Theorem 1, we can be certain there is a stage-game action played by the
commitment type which the normal type’s strategy would (eventually) not play after any private
history. In the setting of Theorem 2, however, the normal type’s deviation from the nonstation-
ary commitment strategy may be much more complicated, and may depend on private (rather
than just public) information.
4.5 Proof of Theorem 1
Suppose, en route to a contradiction, that there is a Nash equilibrium in which reputations do
not necessarily disappear. Then ˜ P(fpt 9 0g) > 0. Let V
1 ´ mini2IfVi
1 : Vi
1 > 0g, that is, V
1 is
the smallest non-zero probability attached to an action under the commitment strategy V1. Since
(V1;V2) is not a Nash equilibrium, V1 plays an action that is suboptimal by at least g > 0 when
35player 2 uses any strategy sufﬁciently close to V2. That is, there exists g > 0, i0 2 I with Vi0
1 > 0
and ¯ n > 0 such that
g < min
ks2¡V2k·¯ n
µ
max
i2I
p1(i;s2)¡p1(i0;s2)
¶
:
Finally, for a given discount factor d1 < 1 there exists a t sufﬁciently large such that the loss
of g for one period is larger than any feasible potential gain deferred by t periods: (1¡d1)g >
dt
12maxijjp1(i; j)j.
Fix the event F from Lemma 2. For n < minf¯ n; 1
2V
1g and t above, let F† and, for s >
T(n;t), C†
s be the events described in Lemma 4. Now consider the normal type of player 1 in
period s > T(n;t) at some state in F†. By (12), she expects player 2 to play within n < ¯ n of
V2 for the next t periods. Playing the action i0 is conditionally dominated in period s, since the
most she can get from playing i0 in period s is worse than playing a best response to V2 for t
periods and then being minmaxed. Thus, on F† the normal type plays action i0 with probability
zero: si0
1s = 0.
Now we calculate a lower bound on the difference between player 2’s beliefs about the
normal type’s probability of playing action i0 in period s, ˜ E[si0
1sjH2s], and the probability the
commitment type plays action i0 on the set of states C†
s:
˜ E
h ¯
¯
¯Vi0
1 ¡ ˜ E[si0
1sjH2s]
¯
¯
¯1C†
s
i
¸ ˜ E
h³
Vi0
1 ¡ ˜ E[si0
1sjH2s]
´
1C†
s
i
¸ V
1
˜ P(C†
s)¡ ˜ E
h
si0
1s1C†
s
i
¸ V
1
˜ P(C†
s)¡
³
˜ P(C†
s)¡ ˜ P(F†)
´
¸ V
1
˜ P(C†
s)¡n ˜ P(F)
¸
1
2
V
1
˜ P(F): (13)
36The ﬁrst inequality above follows from removing the absolute values. The second inequality
applies Vi0
1 ¸ V
1, uses the H2s-measurability of C†
s and applies the properties of conditional
expectations. The third applies the fact that si0
1s = 0 on F† and si0
1s · 1. The fourth inequality
applies (11) in Lemma 4. The ﬁfth inequality follows from n < 1
2V
1 and F ½C†
s (by (10)).
From Corollary 1, pskV1¡ ˜ E( ˜ s1sjH2s)k ! 0 ˜ P-almost surely. It follows that
psjVi0
1 ¡ ˜ E( ˜ si0
1sjH2s)j1C†
s ! 0; ˜ P¡a:s:
But, by Lemma 4, ps > h on the set C†
s, and so
jVi0
1 ¡ ˜ E( ˜ si0
1sjH2s)j1C†
s ! 0; ˜ P¡a:s:
This concludes the proof of Theorem 1, since we now have a contradiction with ˜ P(F)>0 (from
Lemma 2) and (13), which holds for all s > T(n;t).
4.6 Proof of Theorem 2
We ﬁrst argue that, after any sufﬁciently long public history, there is one continuation public
history after which the commitment type will play some action io 2 I with positive probability,
but after which the normal type will choose not to play io, regardless of her private history. To
ﬁnd such a history, notice that ˆ s2 (player 2’s best response to the commitment strategy) is pure
and therefore public, ensuring that the normal player 1 has a public best response to ˆ s2 and that
it is not ˆ s1. Hence, there exists a public history where 1’s public best response differs from the
commitment strategy, for all private histories consistent with this public history. If we can show
this preference is strict, this will still hold when player 2 is just playing close to a best response,
which will open the door to a contradiction. The formal statement is (the proof is in Appendix
37A.5):
Lemma 5 Suppose ˆ s1 is a public strategy with no long-run credibility (with an associated To),
and ˆ s2 is player 2’s public best reply. Then, player 1 has a public best reply, s
†
1, to ˆ s2. There
exists ˆ t 2 N, l > 0, and k > 0 such that for all s > To and each hs 2 Hs, there is an action io,
a period s0 · s+ ˆ t, and a public continuation history ho
s0 of hs, such that
1. ˆ sio
1s0(ho
s0) ¸ l,
2. the action io receives zero probability under s
†
1s0(ho
s0), and
3. player 1’s payoff from playing io and continuing with strategy ˆ s1 is at least k less that
what she gets from playing s
†
1 at ho
s0, i.e.,
E(s†
1; ˆ s2)[p1s0jho
s0]¡E( ˆ s1; ˆ s2)£
(1¡d1)p1(io; js0)+d1p1;s0+1jho
s0
¤
¸ k:
For s > To, Lemma 5 describes how player 1’s best response to ˆ s2 differs from ˆ s1. In the
game with incomplete information, Lemma 5 deﬁnes three Hs-measurable functions, i(¢;s) :
W!I, s0(¢;s):W!ft :s·t ·s+tg, andh(¢;s):W![¥
t=0Yt asfollows: Associatedwitheach
state w 2 W is the implied s-period public history, hs. The action-period pair (i(w;s);s0(w;s))
is the action-period pair (io;s0) from Lemma 5 for the public history hs. Finally, h(w;s) is
the s0(w;s)-period continuation history ho
s0 of hs from Lemma 5. We emphasize that h(w;s)
is typically not the s0(w;s)-period public history of w (for a start, it is Hs-measurable); while
the ﬁrst s-periods of h(w;s) are the s-period public history of w, the next s0(w;s)¡s periods
describe the public signals from Lemma 5.
With these functions in hand, we can describe how player 1’s behavior differs from that of
the commitment type when she is sufﬁciently conﬁdent that player 2 is best responding to the
38commitment type (where r ´ miny;i;jr
y
ij > 0 and l is from Lemma 5; the proof is in Appendix
A.6):
Lemma 6 Suppose the hypotheses of Theorem 2 hold, and suppose there is a Nash equilibrium
in which reputations do not necessarily disappear, i.e., ˜ P(fpt 9 0g) > 0. Let ˆ t, l, and k be the
constants identiﬁed in Lemma 5, and M ´ maxi2I;j2J;`2f1;2gjp`(i; j)j. Suppose t > ˆ t satisﬁes
12Mdt
1 < k, n > 0 satisﬁes 12Mn < krt, and fF†
s gs is the sequence of events identiﬁed in
Corollary 2. For all s ¸ T(n;2t),
1. ˆ s
i(w;s)
1;s0(w;s)(h(w;s)) ¸ l,
2. the set F‡
s ´ fw 2 F†
s : hs0(w;s)(w) = h(w;s)g has probability ˜ P(F‡
s ) ¸ rt ˜ P(F†
s ) > 0, and
3. for all w 2 F‡
s ,
˜ s
i(w;s)
1;s0(w;s)(h1;s0(w;s)(w)) = 0:
If the events F‡
s were known to player 2 in period s, then the argument is now complete,
since there would be a contradiction between player 2’s belief that the normal and commitment
type play the same way on F‡
s and player 1’s actual behavior. However, F‡
s is not known to
player 2. On the other hand, F‡
s is approximated by C‡
s (the analogous modiﬁcation of C†
s,
deﬁned below), an event known by player 2 in period s. At the same time, we must still deal
with the random nature of i(¢;s) and s0(¢;w).
To complete the argument then, suppose the assumptions of Lemma 6 (including the
bounds on t and n) hold, and in addition
n <
2lrt
2lrt +3
: (14)
39The set of states consistent with 2’s information at time s,C†
s, and the “right” continuation
public history, is C‡
s ´ fw 2C†
s : hs0(w)(w) = h(w;s)g. Note that ˜ P(C‡
snF‡
s ) · ˜ P(C†
snF†
s ), and
since C†
s ¾ F†
s , C‡
s ¾ F‡
s . We also partition C‡
s into the subevents corresponding to the relevant
period in which the action i = i(w;s) is not optimal: C‡it
s ´ fw 2C†
s : i(w;s) = i; s0(w;s) = t;
ht(w)=h(w;s)g, so thatC‡
s =[s+t
t=s [i2IC‡it
s . Note thatC‡it
s 2H2t for all i2I andt =s;:::;s+
t.
For each w, let io = i(w;s) and so = s0(w;s). Now, for ﬁxed w and implied ﬁxed ac-
tion io and period so, deﬁne ˆ fs(w) ´ ˆ sio
1so(w) and ˜ fs(w) ´ ˜ E
£
˜ sio
1sojH2so
¤
(w). In the last ex-
pression, for ﬁxed action io and period so, ˜ E
£
˜ sio
1sojH2so
¤
is the conditional expected value of
˜ sio
1so. In particular, for w 2 C‡it
s , so = t and io = i, and we can write ˆ fs(w) ´ ˆ si
1t(w) and
˜ fs(w) ´ ˜ E
£
˜ si
1tjH2t
¤
(w). Then, Zs(w) ´ supt¸s
°
° ˆ s1t ¡ ˜ E[ ˜ s1tjH2t]
°
° ¸
¯
¯ ˆ fs(w)¡ ˜ fs(w)
¯
¯.
So,
˜ E[Zs1C‡
s] ¸ ˜ E
h¡ ˆ fs¡ ˜ fs
¢
£1C‡
s
i
(15)
=
s+t
å
t=så
i2I
˜ E
h¡ ˆ fs¡ ˜ fs
¢
£1C‡it
s
i
=
s+t
å
t=så
i2I
˜ E
h¡
ˆ si
1t ¡ ˜ E
£
˜ si
1tjH2t
¤¢
£1C‡it
s
i
=
s+t
å
t=så
i2I
˜ E
h
˜ E
h¡
ˆ si
1t ¡ ˜ si
1t
¢
1C‡it
s jH2t
ii
; (16)
where the last equality follows from C‡it
s 2 H2t. Now, deﬁne F‡it
s ´ fw 2 F†
s : i(w;s) =
i; s0(w;s) = t; ht(w) = h(w;s)g, and so F‡
s = [s+t
t=s [i2I F‡it
s . Since F†
s ½C†
s, F‡it
s ½C‡it
s , and
40so (16) is at least as large as
s+t
å
t=så
i2I
˜ E
h
˜ E
h¡
ˆ si
1t ¡ ˜ si
1t
¢
1F‡it
s jH2t
ii
¡
s+t
å
t=så
i2I
˜ P
³
C‡it
s nF‡it
s
´
= ˜ E
"Ã
ˆ fs1F‡
s ¡
s+t
å
t=så
i2I
˜ E
h
˜ si
1t1F‡it
s jH2t
i
!#
¡ ˜ P
³
C‡
snF‡
s
´
= ˜ E
h
ˆ fs1F‡
s
i
¡ ˜ P
³
C‡
snF‡
s
´
> l ˜ P(F‡
s )¡ ˜ P(C†
snF†
s ); (17)
where the last equality is an implication of ˜ E
h
˜ si
1t1F‡it
s jH2t
i
= 0 ˜ P-almost surely. Hence, from
the chain from (15) to (17), we have
˜ E[Zs1C‡
s] > lrt ˜ P(F†
s )¡( ˜ P(C†
s)¡ ˜ P(F†
s )): (18)
Applying the bounds n ˜ P(F) > ˜ P(C†
s)¡ ˜ P(F†
s ) and ˜ P(F†
s ) > ˜ P(F)(1¡n) from Corollary 2 to
the right side of (18) gives
˜ E[Zs1C‡
s] > (lrt(1¡n)¡n) ˜ P(F):
The bound (14) ensures that lrt(1¡n)¡n > n=2, and hence
˜ E[Zs1C‡
s] >
1
2
n ˜ P(F):
However, ˜ P(C‡
s) > rt(1¡n) ˜ P(F) > 0 and since C‡
s ½ fw : pt 9 0g, Zs1C‡
s ! 0 ˜ P-almost
surely, the desired contradiction.
5 Imperfect Private Monitoring
In this section, we brieﬂy sketch how our results can be extended to the case of private monitor-
ing and short-lived uninformed players. Instead of observing a public signal y at the end of each
41period, player 1 observes a private signal q (drawn from a ﬁnite set Q) and player 2 observes
a private signal z (drawn from a ﬁnite set Z). A history for a player is the sequence of his or
her actions and private signals. Given the underlying action proﬁle (i; j), we let rij denote a
probability distribution over Q£Z. We use r
qz
ij to denote the probability of the signal proﬁle
(q;z) conditional on (i; j). The marginal distributions are rq
ij = åz r
qz
ij and r
z
ij = åq r
qz
ij . The
case of public monitoring is a special case: take Q = Z and Sq2Qrqq
ij = 1 for all i, j.
We now describe the analogs of our earlier assumptions on the monitoring technology. The
full-support assumption is:
Assumption 5 (FULL SUPPORT) rq
ij;r
z
ij > 0 for all q 2 Q, z 2 Z, and all (i; j) 2 I£J.
Note that we do not assume that r
qz
ij >0 for all (i; j)2I£J and (q;z)2 Q2 (which would rule
out public monitoring). Instead, the full-support assumption is that each signal is observed with
positive probability under every action proﬁle.
Assumption 6 (IDENTIFICATION 1) For all j 2 J, the I columns in the matrix (r
z
ij)z2Z;i2I are
linearly independent.
Assumption 7 (IDENTIFICATION 2) For all i 2 I, the J columns in the matrix (rq
ij)q2Q;j2J are
linearly independent.
Even when monitoring is truly private, in the sense that r
qz
ij > 0 for all (i; j) 2 I £J and
(q;z) 2 Q£Z, reputations can have very powerful short-run effects. This is established in
Theorem 6, which is a minor extension of Fudenberg and Levine [6].14
14While Fudenberg and Levine [6] explicitly assume public monitoring, under Assumption 6, their analysis also
covers imperfect private monitoring. This includes games where player 1 observes no informative signal. In such
42Theorem 6 Suppose the game has imperfect private monitoring satisfying Assumptions 5 and
6. Suppose the commitment type plays the pure action i¤ in every period. For all p0 > 0 and
all e > 0, there exists ¯ d < 1 such that for all d1 > ¯ d, player 1’s expected average discounted
payoff in any Nash equilibrium of the incomplete-information game with short-lived uninformed
players is at least
min
j2BRS(i¤)
p1(i¤; j)¡e;
where
BRS(i) = argmax
j2J
p2(i; j):
The proof of the following extension of Theorem 1 to the private monitoring case is essen-
tially identical to that of Theorem 1 apart from the added notational inconvenience of private
signals.
Theorem 7 Suppose the imperfect private monitoring satisﬁes Assumptions 5, 6, and 7 and V1
satisﬁes Assumption 4. Then at any Nash equilibrium of the incomplete-information game with
short-lived uninformed players, pt ! 0 ˜ P-almost surely.
a case, when there is complete information, the one-period-memory strategies that we describe as equilibria in
Section 2 of Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson [4] are also equilibria of the game with private monitoring. We thank
Juuso V¨ alim¨ aki for showing us how to construct such equilibria.
43A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Theorem 5
Since pt ! 0 ˜ P-almost surely, we have pt ! 1 ˆ P-almost surely. For any e;n > 0 there exists a
T such that for all t > T, ˜ P(pt > e)+ ˆ P(pt < 1¡e) < n. Hence, for t0 > T,
0 ·
Z
S£[0;1]
[u2(s1;s2)¡u2(s1;x2(s2;pt))]d(p0 ˆ rt +(1¡ p0)˜ rt)
· (1¡ p0)
Z
S£[0;e]
[u2(s1;s2)¡u2(s1;x2(s2;pt))]d ˜ rt
+p0
Z
S£[1¡e;1]
[u2(s1;s2)¡u2(s1;x2(s2;pt))]d ˆ rt +2Mn;
where M is an upper bound on the magnitude of the stage-game payoffs and the ﬁrst inequality
follows from (6). As x2 is measurable with respect to pt, we can ensure that the ﬁnal integral in
the preceding expression is zero by setting x2(s2;pt)=s2 for pt >e, and hence, for any e;n >0
and for all x2,
Z
S£[0;e]
[u2(s1;s2)¡u2(s1;x2(s2;pt))]d ˜ rt ¸ ¡
2Mn
1¡ p0
: (A.1)
Again, because ˜ P(pt > e) < n, (A.1) implies
Z
S£[0;1]
[u2(s1;s2)¡u2(s1;x2(s2;pt))]d ˜ rt ¸ ¡
2Mn
1¡ p0
¡2Mn:
Integrating out pt implies that, for all x0
2 : S2 ! S2,
Z
S
[u2(s1;s2)¡u2(s1;x0
2(s2))]d ˜ mt ¸ ¡
2Mn
1¡ p0
¡2Mn: (A.2)
Consider now a convergent subsequence, denoted ˜ mtk with limit ˜ m¥, and suppose ˜ m¥ is
not a correlated equilibrium. Since (5) holds for all t0, it also holds in the limit. If ˜ m¥ is not a
44correlated equilibrium, it must then be the case that for some x00
2 : S2 ! S2, there exists k > 0
so that
Z
S
[u2(s1;s2)¡u2(s1;x00
2 (s2))]d ˜ m¥ < ¡k < 0:
But then for tk sufﬁciently large,
Z
S
[u2(s1;s2)¡u2(s1;x00
2 (s2))]d ˜ mtk <
¡k
2
< 0;
contradicting (A.2) for n sufﬁciently small.
A.2 Completion of the Proof of Lemma 2
Turning to the general case, let M ´ maxi2I;j2J;`2f1;2gjp`(i; j)j, so that M is an upper bound on
the magnitude of stage-game payoffs. Let a = eo=6M, where eo is given by Deﬁnition 5. If
Zt · a, player 2’s expected continuation payoffs at h2s under the strategy proﬁle ( ˜ s1; ˆ s1;s2)
are within 2Ma of his continuation payoff under the proﬁle ( ˆ s1; ˆ s1;s2). Hence, if Zt · a and
history h2s (for s ¸t ¸ To) occurs with positive probability, then
¯
¯
¯E( ˜ s1; ˆ s1;s2)[p2s j h2s]¡E( ˆ s1; ˆ s1;s2)[p2s j h2s]
¯
¯
¯ < 2Ma (A.3)
for all s2.
We now show that if Zt · a for t ¸ To, then player 2 plays the pure action j¤(hs) in all fu-
ture periods. Suppose instead that the equilibrium s2 plays j 6= j¤(hs) with positive probability
in period s under a history h2s. Deﬁne s0
2 to be identical to s2 except that, after the history h2s,
it places zero probability weight on the action j¤(hs) and increases the probability of all other
actions played by s2 by equal weight. Let ˆ s2 be player 2’s best response to the commitment
45type. Then, if Zt · a we have15
E( ˜ s1; ˆ s1;s2)[p2s j h2s] = E( ˜ s1; ˆ s1;s0
2)[p2s j h2s]
· E( ˆ s1; ˆ s1;s0
2)[p2s j h2s]+2Ma
· E( ˆ s1; ˆ s1; ˆ s2)[p2s j h2s]¡eo+2Ma
· E( ˜ s1; ˆ s1; ˆ s2)[p2s j h2s]¡eo+4Ma:
As 4Ma < eo, ˆ s2 is a proﬁtable deviation after the history h2s for player 2—a contradiction.
Hence on the event Zt · a player 2 plays j¤(hs) in all future periods. Equivalently, we have
shown fZt · ag ½ Go
t . Choose T ¸ To such that pt > h and ˜ E[ZtjH2t] < ax for all t > T.
Condition (8) now follows from ˜ P[fZt > ag j H2t] < x for all t > T on F.
A.3 Completion of the Proof of Lemma 3
The proof for t ¸ 1 follows by induction. In particular, we have
Pr[Kjh1;s+t+1] = Pr[Kjh1s;ys;is;:::;ys+t;is+t]
=
Pr[Kjh1s]Pr[ys;is;:::;ys+t;is+tjK;h1s]
Pr[ys;is;:::;ys+t;is+tjh1s]
=
Pr[Kjh1s]Õ
s+t
z=s åjr
yz
iz j ˜ E[s
j
2(h2z)jK;h1s]
Õ
s+t
z=s åjr
yz
iz j ˜ E[s
j
2(h2z)jh1s]
;
15The equality applies the fact that in equilibrium, player 2 is indifferent between actions played with positive
probability. The ﬁrst inequality applies (A.3). The second inequality applies Deﬁnition 5.1. The third inequality
applies (A.3) again.
46where h1;z+1 = (h1z;yz;iz). Hence,
¯
¯Pr[Kjh1;s+t+1]¡Pr[Kjh1s]
¯
¯
¸ Pr[Kjh1s]
¯
¯
¯
¯
¯
s+t
Õ
z=så
j
r
yz
iz j ˜ E[s
j
2(h2z)jK;h1s]¡
s+t
Õ
z=så
j
r
yz
iz j ˜ E[s
j
2(h2z)jh1s]
¯
¯
¯
¯
¯
:
The left side of this inequality converges to zero ˜ P-almost surely, and hence so does the right
side. Moreover, applying the triangle inequality and rearranging, we ﬁnd that the right side is
larger than
Pr[Kjh1s]
¯
¯
¯
¯
¯
s+t¡1
Õ
z=s å
j
r
yz
iz j ˜ E[s
j
2(h2z)jh1s]
¯
¯
¯
¯
¯
£
¯
¯
¯
¯
¯å
j
r
ys+t
is+t j ˜ E[s
j
2(h2;s+t)jK;h1s]¡å
j
r
ys+t
is+t j ˜ E[s
j
2(h2;s+t)jh1s]
¯
¯
¯
¯
¯
¡Pr[Kjh1s]
¯
¯
¯
¯
¯
s+t¡1
Õ
z=s å
j
r
yz
iz j ˜ E[s
j
2(h2z)jK;h1s]¡
s+t¡1
Õ
z=s å
j
r
yz
iz j ˜ E[s
j
2(h2z)jh1s]
¯
¯
¯
¯
¯
£
¯
¯
¯
¯
¯å
j
r
ys+t
is+t j ˜ E[s
j
2(h2;s+t)jK;h1s]
¯
¯
¯
¯
¯
:
From the induction hypothesis that k ˜ E[s2zjb (H1s;H2t)]¡ ˜ E[s2zjH1s]k converges to zero ˜ P-
almost surely for every z 2 fs;:::;s+t ¡1g, the negative term also converges to zero ˜ P-almost
surely. But then the ﬁrst term also converges to zero, and, as above, the result holds for z=s+t.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. Fix n 2 (0;1) and a number of periods t > 0. Fix x < (1
4n ˜ P(F))2, and let T denote the
critical period identiﬁed in Lemma 2 for this value of x.
Player1’sminimum estimated probability on j¤(hs0) over periods s;:::;s+t can be written
as fs ´mins·s0·s+t ˜ E[s
j¤(hs0)
2s0 jH1s]. Noticethat fs >1¡n isasufﬁcientconditionforinequality
47(12).
The ﬁrst part of the proof is to ﬁnd a lower bound for fs. For any t · s, the triangle
inequality implies
1 ¸ fs ¸ min
s·s0·s+t
˜ E[s
j¤(hs0)
2s0 jb(H1s;H2t)]¡kt
s;
where kt
s ´ maxs·s0·s+t j ˜ E[s
j¤(hs0)
2s0 jb(H1s;H2t)]¡ ˜ E[s
j¤(hs0)
2s0 jH1s]j for t · s. By Lemma 3,
lims!¥kt
s = 0 ˜ P-almost surely.
As s
j¤(hs0)
2s0 · 1 and is equal to 1 on Go
t , the above implies
fs ¸ ˜ P(Go
t j b(H1s;H2t))¡kt
s:
Moreover, thesequenceofrandomvariablesf ˜ P(Go
t jb(H1s;H2t))gs isamartingalewithrespect
to the ﬁltration fH1sgs, and so converges almost surely to a limit, gt ´ ˜ P(Go
t jb(H1¥;H2t)).
Hence
1 ¸ fs ¸ gt ¡kt
s¡`t
s; (A.4)
where `t
s ´ jgt ¡ ˜ P(Go
t jb(H1s;H2t))j and lims!¥`t
s = 0 ˜ P-almost surely.
The second step of the proof determines the sets C†
s and a set that we will use to later
determine F†. For any t ¸ T, deﬁne
Kt ´ fw : ˜ P(Go
t j H2t) > 1¡x ; pt > hg 2 H2t:
Let Fs
t denote the event \s
t=tKt and set Ft ´ \¥
t=tKt; note that liminfKt ´ [¥
t=T \¥
t=t Kt =
[¥
t=TFt. By Lemma 2, F ½ Kt for all t ¸ T, so F ½ Fs
t , F ½ Ft, and F ½ liminfKt.
Deﬁne Nt ´ fw : gt ¸ 1¡
p
xg. Set C†
s ´ Fs
T 2 H2s and deﬁne an intermediate set F¤ by
F¤ ´ FT \NT. BecauseC†
s ½ Ks, (9) holds. In addition, F¤[F ½C†
s, and hence (10) holds with
48F¤ in the role of F†. By deﬁnition,
˜ P(C†
s)¡ ˜ P(F¤) = ˜ P(C†
s \(FT \NT)) = ˜ P((C†
s \ ¯ FT)[(C†
s \ ¯ NT));
where we use bars to denote complements. By our choice of C†
s, the event C†
s \ ¯ NT is a subset
of the event KT \ ¯ NT. Thus, we have the bound
˜ P(C†
s)¡ ˜ P(F¤) · ˜ P(C†
s \ ¯ FT)+ ˜ P(KT \ ¯ NT): (A.5)
We now ﬁnd upper bounds for the two terms on the right side of (A.5). First notice that ˜ P(C†
s \
¯ FT) = ˜ P(Fs
T)¡ ˜ P(FT). Since lims!¥ ˜ P(Fs
T) = ˜ P(FT), there exists T0 ¸ T such that
˜ P(C†
s \ ¯ FT) <
p
x for all s ¸ T0: (A.6)
Also, as ˜ P(Go
t jKt) > 1¡x and Kt 2 H2t, the properties of iterated expectations imply that
1¡x < ˜ P(Go
t jKt) = ˜ E[gtjKt]. Since gt · 1, we have
1¡x < ˜ E[gt j Kt] · (1¡
p
x) ˜ P( ¯ Nt j Kt)+ ˜ P(Nt j Kt)
= 1¡
p
x ˜ P( ¯ Nt j Kt):
The extremes of the above inequality imply that ˜ P( ¯ NtjKt) <
p
x. Hence, taking t = T we get
˜ P(KT \ ¯ NT) <
p
x: (A.7)
Using (A.6) and (A.7) in (A.5), ˜ P(C†
s)¡ ˜ P(F¤) < 2
p
x for all s ¸ T0. Given F ½C†
s, the
bound on x, and n < 1, it follows that
˜ P(F¤) > ˜ P(F)¡2
p
x >
1
2
˜ P(F) > 0:
Finally, we combine the two steps above to obtain F†. As ˜ P(F¤)>0 and kT
s +`T
s converges
almost surely to zero, by Egorov’s Theorem, there exists F† ½ F¤ such that ˜ P(F¤nF†) <
p
x
49and a time T00 > T such that kT
s +`T
s <
p
x on F† for all s ¸ T00. Since F†[F ½ F¤[F ½C†
s,
(10) holds. Let T(n;t) ´ maxfT00;T0g. Also, gT ¸ 1¡
p
x on F†, because F† ½ NT. Hence
on F†, by (A.4), fs > 1¡2
p
x for all s > T(n;t). This, and the bound on x, implies (12).
Moreover, as ˜ P(F¤nF†) <
p
x and ˜ P(C†
s)¡ ˜ P(F¤) < 2
p
x, (11) holds for all s > T(n;t).
A.5 Proof of Lemma 5
Since ˆ s1 is public, player 2 has a best reply ˆ s2 that is public, and so player 1 has a public best
reply s
†
1 to ˆ s2. By Deﬁnition 5.2, for every s-period public history hs, s > To, we have
E(s†
1; ˆ s2)[p1sjhs] > E( ˆ s1; ˆ s2)[p1sjhs]+eo: (A.8)
Since s
†
1 is a best response to ˆ s2, player 1’s payoff E(s†
1; ˆ s2)[p1sjhs] is unchanged if the period-s
mixture s
†
1(hs) is replaced by any other mixture that remains within the support of s
†
1(hs), and
thereafter play continues according to s
†
1.
For s > To and hs 2 Hs, let ¡(hs) be the set of public histories hs0, s0 ¸ s, that are continua-
tions of hs and s0 is the ﬁrst period in which there is an action in I receiving positive probability
under ˆ s1 but receiving zero probability under s
†
1.16 Note that ¡(hs) is at most countable. In
addition, there are no two elements of ¡(hs) with the property that one is a continuation of the
other. For hs0 2 ¡(hs), s0 > s, in period s, every action that receives positive probability under
strategy ˆ s1 also receives positive probability under s
†
1, and so the comment after equation (A.8)
16Because s
†
1 is a best response to ˆ s2, there must exist such histories, since otherwise every action accorded
positive probability by ˆ s1 would be optimal, contradicting (A.8).
50implies
E(s†
1; ˆ s2)[p1sjhs]¡E( ˆ s1; ˆ s2)[p1sjhs] =
å
i2I
ˆ si
1(hs)d1
h
E(s†
1; ˆ s2)[p1;s+1j(hs;i)]¡E( ˆ s1; ˆ s2)[p1;s+1j(hs;i)]
i
:
Applying this reasoning iteratively allows us to rewrite (A.8) as
eo < å
hs02¡(hs)
ˆ Q(hs0jhs)ds0¡s
1
h
E(s†
1; ˆ s2)[p1s0jhs0]¡E( ˆ s1; ˆ s2)[p1s0jhs0]
i
(A.9)
where ˆ Q(hs0jhs) is the probability of hs0 given hs under ( ˆ s1; ˆ s2).17
Choose ˆ t such that 2Md ˆ t
1 < eo=3. The terms in (A.9) corresponding to histories longer
than s+ ˆ t can then collectively contribute at most eo=3 to the sum. The remaining terms must
then sum to at least 2eo=3. Letting ¡(hs; ˆ t) denote the set of histories in ¡(hs) no longer than
s+ ˆ t, we have
2eo
3
< å
¡(hs;ˆ t)
ˆ Q(hs0jhs)ds0¡s
1
h
E(s†
1; ˆ s2)[p1s0jhs0]¡E( ˆ s1; ˆ s2)[p1s0jhs0]
i
:
Let ¡¤(hs; ˆ t) be the histories in ¡(hs; ˆ t) satisfying
E(s†
1; ˆ s2)[p1s0jhs0]¡E( ˆ s1; ˆ s2)[p1s0jhs0] ¸
eo
3
: (A.10)
Then,
2eo
3
< ˆ Q(¡¤(hs; ˆ t)jhs)2M+(1¡ ˆ Q(¡¤(hs; ˆ t)jhs))
eo
3
;
and so
ˆ Q(¡¤(hs; ˆ t)jhs) > q ´
eo
6M¡eo
17It is possible that åhs02¡(hs) ˆ Q(hs0jhs) < 1. However, expected payoffs under (s
†
1; ˆ s2) and ( ˆ s1; ˆ s2) are equal
after any history not in ¡(hs), and such histories can then be omitted from (A.9).
51(the denominator is positive, since Deﬁnition 5 implies eo · 2M).
There are at most Y ˆ t histories in ¡¤(hs; ˆ t). In the last period of each such history, there is
an action i 2 I that is played with positive probability by ˆ s1 and zero probability by s
†
1. Since
there are at most I such actions, there is a history ho
s0(hs) 2 ¡¤(hs; ˆ t) and action io(hs) such that,
under ( ˆ s1; ˆ s2), the probability that the history ho
s0(hs) occurs and is followed by action io(hs) is
at least l ´ q=(IY ˆ t). Trivially, then, ˆ sio
1s0(ho
s0) ¸ l.
Finally, since
E( ˆ s1; ˆ s2)[p1s0jho
s0] · lE( ˆ s1; ˆ s2)£
(1¡d1)p1(io; js0)+d1p1;s0+1jho
s0
¤
+(1¡l)E(s†
1; ˆ s2)[p1s0jhs0];
from (A.10), we have
E(s†
1; ˆ s2)[p1s0jho
s0]¡E( ˆ s1; ˆ s2)£
(1¡d1)p1(io; js0)+d1p1;s0+1jho
s0
¤
¸
eo
3l
´ k:
A.6 Proof of Lemma 6
We prove only the second and third assertions (the ﬁrst being an immediate implication of
Lemma 5 and the deﬁnitions of i, s0, and h).
Since w 2 F†
s and projs(w0) = projs(w) implies w0 2 F†
s , for any s-period public history
consistent with a state in F†
s , and any s0-period (s0 > s) public continuation of that history, there
is at least one state in F†
s consistent with that continuation. Consequently, since every t period
public history has probability at least rt, ˜ P(F‡
s ) ¸ rt ˜ P(F†
s ) > rt(1¡n) ˜ P(F) > 0.
After any public history, the normal type’s payoffs under (s
†
1; ˆ s2) are independent of her
private histories—she is playing her public best response to a public strategy. At states in F‡
s ,
52from Corollary 2, under ˜ s1, player 1 expects player 2’s future play (over the periods s;s+
1;:::;s+2t) to be within n of his best response to the commitment strategy, ˆ s2. Hence, on
F‡
s , player 1 expects that player 2’s future play (over the periods s;s+1;:::;s+2t) to be within
nr¡t of his best response to the commitment strategy, ˆ s2, irrespective of her play in those
periods. Discounted to the period s0 · s+t, payoffs from periods after s+2t can differ by at
most 2Mdt
1. Hence, for states in F‡
s , and for any s1,
¯
¯
¯E(s1;s2)[p1s0 j H1s0]¡E(s1; ˆ s2)[p1s0 j H1s0]
¯
¯
¯ · (nr¡t +dt
1)2M < k=3:
Lemma 5.3 and the restrictions on t and n then imply, for w 2 F‡
s ,
E(s†
1;s2)[p1s0jH1s0] ¸
k
3
+E( ˆ s1;s2)[(1¡d1)p(i(w;s); js0)+d1p1s0+1jH1s0]:
Hence, after the public history h(w;s), no private history for player 1 (consistent with F‡
s )
makes playing action i(w;s) proﬁtable.
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